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## THESIS

INCENTIVES FOR RECRUITERS

by

Mark L. Skidmore

September 1992

Thesis Advisor:

David R. Henderson

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Incentives for Recruiters

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy  
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Submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to study the different types of incentives for recruiters that are used in the private sector of the U. S. economy and in the U.S. Navy, and to examine how, if possible, incentives that are used for civilian recruiters can be applied to the Navy.

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## I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this thesis is to study the different types of incentives for recruiters that are used in the private sector of the U.S. economy and in the U.S. Navy, and to examine how, if possible, incentives that are used for civilian recruiters can be applied to the Navy.

### A. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Navy has a unique labor market in that it "grows its own labor force." That is, the Navy promotes its people from within. In the enlisted corps, all enlistees start "at the bottom and work their way up." The officer corps is basically the same. The Navy rarely recruits people to mid-junior grade levels except in some specialized communities, such as the Nurse and Doctor corps.

In times of drawdown and shrinking budgets, one may ask, "why do we need recruiters?" Recruiters are needed for two basic reasons. First, as previously mentioned, the Navy grows its own. Just because of drawdown conditions or even a sluggish economy, the Navy still needs recruiters to attract quality people for the Naval Service. Second, the recruiting process acts as the screening mechanism to ensure that quality recruits enter the Naval Service. So whether the economy is

good or bad, whether there is drawdown or growth, the Navy will always need recruiters.

The U.S. Navy has approximately 500,000 service members. Managing and maintaining its force is an awesome management challenge. In order to recruit the most effective and eligible people, Navy personnel planners and decision-makers rely on their recruiters to attract and select the most potentially qualified personnel. Not only is the Navy concerned with incentives for recruits, but also the Navy is concerned with incentives for its recruiters. "The management challenge is to employ these recruiters as efficiently as possible." [Ref.. 1:p. 7]

#### **B. AN OUTLINE OF THE RECRUITING PROCESS**

The recruiting process can be thought of in three dimensions: the market for recruits, the recruiters, and the recruiting areas and districts.

##### **1. The Market for Recruits**

The first dimension is the market for recruits. In order to determine the mental group category of each recruit, the Navy uses the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) percentile score.

Upper-mental-group (UMG) recruits score at or above the 50th percentile on the AFQT [and are divided into MG1 (percentiles 93 to 99), MG2 (percentiles 65 to 92), and MG3 [upper (U) or A] (percentiles 50 to 64)]. Lower-mental-group (LMG) recruits score below the 50th percentile and are divided into MG3 [lower (L) or B]

(percentiles 31 to 49) and MG4 (percentiles 10 to 30). MG5 (percentiles 1 to 9) individuals are not recruited. [Ref.1:p. 5]

Recruits are further classified as either High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG) or Non High School Diploma Graduates/General Equivalency Diplomas (NHSDG/GED). Table I illustrates the matrix of recruit quality.

**Table I. MATRIX OF RECRUIT QUALITY BY MENTAL CATEGORY.**

---

Percentile	Mental Category
93 to 99	1
65 to 92	2
50 to 64	3 Upper (U) or A
31 to 49	3 Lower (L) or B
10 to 30	4
0 to 9	5

Source: CNA Research Memorandum 86-269.

---

Crossing mental groups one through four (group five, is not recruited) with HSDG status defines six recruit quality categories. These are the categories used by Navy manpower planners and are illustrated in Table II.

## **2. The Recruiters**

The second dimension of Navy recruiting is recruiters. Navy enlisted recruiters can be categorized into three broad functions: production recruiters whose main task is to enlist new recruits; supervisory recruiters who are primarily

**Table II. MATRIX OF RECRUIT QUALITY BY HSDG STATUS.**

Mental Category	Education Certificate	
	HSDG	NHSDG/GED
1 - 3A	A - cell	B - cell
3B	CU - cell	DU - cell
4	CL - cell	DL - cell

Source: CNA Research Memorandum 88-27.

concerned with managing the production recruiting force; and a small number of recruiters who do not enlist new recruits but have more specialized duties such as community relations and oversight of the Delayed Entry Program (DEP<sup>1</sup>). [Ref. 1:p. 6]

### **3. The Areas and Districts**

The final dimension is the recruiting areas and districts. There are six recruiting areas which are further subdivided into 41 recruiting districts. These are summarized in Table III.

With these three dimensions in place, the management challenge, then, is to employ the recruiters as efficiently as possible across the six areas and 41 districts to recruit the highest quality recruit at the lowest possible cost. Because

---

<sup>1</sup>The Delayed Entry Program (DEP) allows a person to sign an enlistment contract up to one year in advance of actually entering the Navy and beginning active duty.

Table III. RECRUITING AREAS, DISTRICTS, AND LOCATIONS.

Area	District	Location
1	101	Albany
	102	Boston
	103	Buffalo
	104	New York
	119	Philadelphia
	161	Iselin (NJ)
(Southeast)	310	Montgomery
	311	Columbia
	312	Jacksonville
	313	Atlanta
	314	Nashville
	315	Raleigh
	316	Richmond
	348	Miami
4 (North Central)	406	Harrisburg
	409	Washington
	417	Cleveland
	418	Columbus
	420	Pittsburgh
	422	Detroit
5 (Midwest)	521	Chicago
	524	St. Louis
	526	Louisville
	527	Kansas City
	528	Minneapolis
	529	Omaha

	542	Indianapolis
	559	Milwaukee
7 (Southwest)	725	Denver
	730	Albuquerque
	731	Dallas
	732	Houston
	733	Little Rock
	734	New Orleans
	746	San Antonio
	747	Memphis
8 (West)	836	Los Angeles
	837	Portland
	838	San Francisco
	839	Seattle
	840	San Diego

Source: CNA Research Memorandum 88-27.

the number of people recruited and their quality vary substantially with the recruiters' effectiveness, Navy planners offer incentives to their recruiters to encourage individual recruiters to recruit the highest quality recruit possible.

Providing recruiters with a good system of incentives promotes desirable levels of effort in both good and bad recruiting markets. With such a system, recruiters are encouraged to be as productive as possible, consistent with an acceptable (or optimum) individual level of effort. [Ref. 2:p. 1]

In recent years, several excellent studies of Navy recruiting have been done. In his 1986 study of Individual Incentives in Navy Recruiting, Timothy W. Cooke of the Center

for Naval Analysis found that "incentives for individual recruiters are currently tied to a fixed standard of performance, independent of the relative difficulty of the recruiting market in a particular geographic area." Specifically, he examined data on Freeman points earned i.e., points earned by recruiters who exceed their quota.

#### C. THE FREEMAN PLAN

In 1979, the Navy implemented the Recruiter Productivity and Personnel Management System (RPPMS), otherwise known as the Freeman Plan<sup>2</sup>. This program stayed in effect until 1989 when it was canceled. A recruiter's productivity was measured by the number of new enlistment contracts obtained in a 12-month period less any attrition of individuals in the DEP awaiting accession. The Freeman Plan also required a minimum of two enlistments per month (not including DEP attrition) which had to meet policy requirements for desired mental aptitude and HSDG status.. [Ref. 2:p. 2]

Under the Freeman Plan, points were awarded to the recruiter depending on three determinants of the quality of a recruit. The first determinant was the entrance quality of the recruit. The mental group crossed with HSDG status determined the number of points awarded to a recruiter for a

---

<sup>2</sup>The plan was named for Admiral Dewitt Freeman, who, while working as a special advisor to Commander, Navy Recruiting Command, devised this plan to enhance recruiter productivity by offering a system of awards for top performers. [Ref.3:p. 5]

**Table IV. FREEMAN PLAN POINTS BY RECRUIT QUALITY.**

---

Status	Mental Group				
	I	II	IIIU	IIIL	IV
HSDG	116	107	100	90	70
NHSDG	100	90	85	65	--

Source: CNA Research Memorandum 86-269.

---

particular quality of recruit. Table IV lists the Freeman Plan points by recruit quality. [Ref. 2:p. 2]

Accumulation of Freeman Plan points then translated into four recruiter awards. These four awards required the following average point accumulations per month measured over a 12-month period [Ref. 1:p. 14 and Ref. 2:p. 2]:

1. Certificate of Commendation: 300 points
2. Navy Achievement Medal: 350 points
3. Voluntary extension of recruiting duty: 400 points
4. Advancement of pay grade: 525 points

The Certificate of Commendation is a recognition of individual performance. Although less prestigious than the other three awards, the certificate is placed in the service jacket (permanent record) of the recruiter and is worth advancement points to the next grade at the next promotion cycle.

The Navy Achievement medal is also worth advancement points and is a personal decoration for exemplary individual

performance. This is an actual medal and is worn at dress occasions, such as changes of command, while a ribbon signifying the medal is usually worn with other uniforms.

Voluntary extension of duty may be preferred by an individual who is particularly enjoying recruiting duty and desires to remain in a particular geographic location for an extended period of time.

Advancement of pay grade is probably the most desirable of all awards. This means not only an increase in rank but also an increase in length of service (longevity) pay.

The second determinant of recruit quality is survivor rate: the propensity of a recruit to complete a term of enlistment and to reenlist: CNA analysts reported 40-month survival rates for non-prior-service male recruits of fiscal year (FY) 1981. For example, survival rates for male, non-prior-service recruits in category I with a high school diploma were 0.75 while male, non-prior-service recruits of the same category but without a high school diploma had a survival rate of 0.49. Cooke suggests that these survival rates have implications for the appropriate dispersion of the Freeman Plan point awards. That is, "if the relative value of recruits to the Navy is determined solely by survival profiles (and it should not be), the implied point values are defined as ratios of the survival rates." [Ref. 2:p. 4] For example, the ratio of the two survival rates mentioned above (0.75 and 0.49) is 1.53 (0.75/0.49). This implies that a male, non-

prior-service recruit with a high school diploma in category I is 1.53 times as "valuable" as a male, non-prior-service recruit of the same category but without a high school diploma. Table V displays how Freeman Plan points would be awarded if based solely on survivor rates.

Table V. FREEMAN PLAN POINTS BY SURVIVOR RATES.

---

Status	Mental Group				
	I	II	IIIU	IIIL	IV
HSDG	107	107	100	94	90
NHSDG	70	66	57	57	--

Source: CNA Research Memorandum 86-269.

---

Note that the ratio of HSDG category I to NHSDG category I is  $107/70 = 1.53$ . This is the same value of the ratio of respective survivor rates as shown above. All other categories also have the same ratio values as do their respective survivor rates as reported by CNA analysts.

The final dimension of recruit quality is the difference in productivity, or contribution to readiness, between recruits. Unfortunately, measuring productivity of a recruit is extremely subjective; as such, there is very little empirical data on the differences in productivity between recruits and very little is known about the extent of marginal productivity between the categories of recruits. Therefore, Freeman Plan point tabulations for productivity do not exist.

Cooke best summarized the Freeman Plan:

The Freeman plan is a simple prize system, with fixed performance criteria. At the extremes, there may be no winners or all recruiters may receive a prize.

#### D. PROBLEMS WITH THE FREEMAN PLAN

A basic discrepancy with the Freeman Plan is the manner in which points are awarded. If Freeman Plan points are awarded based on recruit mental category, then according to table IV, a NHSDG of mental group I is more valuable than a HSDG of mental group IIIL. But if Freeman Plan points are awarded by survivor rate (the propensity of a recruit to survive to the end of his first term and reenlist) then, according to table V, a NHSDG of mental group I is not as valuable as a HSDG of mental group IIIL. Therefore, the distribution of incentive points in table IV overestimates the relative value of NHSDG recruits. Thus, a recruiter may be more likely to recruit a NHSDG of mental group I simply because of the incentive point value even though such a particular recruit is less valuable to the Navy in terms of survivor potential.

Another problem exists. The six regions and 41 recruiting districts are inherently different. Even if area and district boundaries could be instantaneously redefined to perfection, they would soon change because of continuously changing demographics. Areas and districts will always be different. A given skill and effort on the part of a recruiter in one region may produce more qualified recruits than the same skill

and effort in another and vice versa. Therefore, a quota system that assigns the same quota to recruiters in each area and district and one that gives the same incentive for producing beyond the quota is unlikely to be optimal.

Assuming performance of all recruiters is relatively equal across the six areas and 41 districts, then differences in the recruiting market may be reflected in two ways; by differences in the number of awards won in a particular area or district, or by changes in the percentage of recruiters winning awards over time.

#### E. COOKE'S FINDINGS

In his study, Cooke examines Freeman Point tabulations in three ways: (1) the means of Freeman Point Distributions by area and year (1980-84), (2) percentiles (50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 95) of Freeman Point Distributions by area and year, and (3) the number and percentage of recruiters in each area who achieved each of the award levels by fiscal year. Cooke finds that the distribution of Freeman Points over time and across regions varies. "From the perspective of the Freeman award plan, recruiters achieve better results in some years than others and in some places than others." [Ref. 2:p. 12] That is, assuming that recruiter ability is equal across areas and districts and time, then an inequality of outcome reflects recruiting opportunity or lack thereof. Therefore, an incen-

tive system other than one of a fixed performance criterion may provide a better incentive mechanism for recruiters.

#### **F. COOKE'S PROPOSAL**

In the recruiting process, Navy planners must balance uncertain variables while allocating recruiting resources. Such variables include recruit possibilities, recruiter population and effort, past production, and economic and demographic conditions. These variables lead to uncertainty in the recruiting process. But, as Cooke points out, "recent research in the economics of incentives reveals that, under some conditions regarding sources of uncertainty about recruiter effort, competitively determined rewards are better incentive devices than piece rate schemes (bounties) or tournaments with a non-competitive prize structure."

#### **G. BENEFITS OF A COMPETITIVE INCENTIVE PLAN**

A competitive incentive plan is one where an individual is compared to his peers rather than to a fixed performance standard, such as the Freeman Plan.

The benefit of a competitive plan is that it adapts automatically to its environment which, in terms of recruiters, encourages greater recruiter effort whether the market is good or bad, difficult or easy. Furthermore, increased efficiency would result and also, planners would not have to consider matching incentives to changing market conditions for

recruits. Thus, a competitive reward system based on relative performance among recruiters by area or even district may tend to equalize reward opportunities for a given level or effort.

Rewards based only on performance relative to others in the same area may increase production incentives for recruiters in relatively difficult recruiting areas; they are not discouraged by the difficulty of reaching specified point accumulation totals. They instead are awarded according to their ability and effort relative to other recruiters in similar circumstances. [Ref. 2:p. 13]

Therefore, if Commander, Naval Recruiting Command (COMNAV-CRUITCOM or CNRC) did not use a point accumulation system based on fixed performance criteria but, instead, used relative performance criteria where the top "X" percent of recruiters in each area or district received a certain type of award, then the relative performance criteria would encourage recruiter effort in both good and bad markets and the efficiency of the recruiting process would increase.

#### **H. POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS OF A COMPETITIVE INCENTIVE PLAN**

In the Freeman Plan, a recruiter's performance was compared to the performance of all other recruiters throughout the country. Because the Freeman Plan was a fixed prize system, each recruiter competed for awards with all other recruiters not just within a district or area but across the nation. Because areas and districts are so large, it may be appealing to reduce the size of the geographic area in which recruiters are competing to meet a competitive performance system.

But Cooke discusses three potential problems with a competitive incentive plan. The first is that of collusion. Depending on the size of the area or district, recruiters may collude to reduce their level of performance and effort and thereby reduce production. Thus, given collusion, competitive awards would be handed out for a relatively lower level of performance compared to that of fixed performance criteria. But collusion is highly unlikely given the sizes of the areas and districts and the numbers of recruiters assigned to each particular area and district. The areas and districts are just too big and there are too many recruiters for collusion, if any, to be effective. [Ref. 1:p. 19 and Ref. 2:p. 13]

The second potential problem with a competitive incentive plan, Cooke mentions, is that those recruiters who feel they "know" they cannot achieve the top "X" percent will be less motivated to be productive than they would be under a fixed incentive plan. With a fixed incentive plan, a particular level of effort may result in an award while in a competitive system, the same level of effort may not result in an award. Therefore, those recruiters who feel they cannot achieve the top "X" percent with a reasonable effort may not find it worthwhile to put in extra effort.

But what about those who easily achieve their goals and find themselves in the top "X" percent? Once they have reached their goal, why should they expend extra effort? That is, if a recruiter maximizes his or her award, then why

achieve even more? Just as underachieving can prove detrimental to productivity, so can overachieving.

The final potential problem with a competitive incentive plan is that of variation of recruiting opportunity. Recruiting opportunities can vary not only within and between districts but also between areas. For example, for any given area, some districts may have comparable recruiting opportunities while others may not. Although it is highly unlikely and would be extremely difficult to measure, some areas may have comparable recruiting opportunities. Therefore, depending on the equality of recruiting opportunities, a competitive incentive system may be applicable to only one particular district or it may be applicable to several districts, or even areas.

A competitive incentive plan, then, if used, must be carefully administered. For example, if two noncomparable districts are operating under the same competitive incentive plan, then the disadvantaged district would not find it economically rewarding to put forth extra effort while the other district may reduce its productivity once it has met its goals. The overall effect may be even less productivity for the two districts than if they had been operating under a fixed incentive plan. The same argument may hold true for two or more given areas.

Although a competitive incentive plan has its advantages, such disadvantages as those mentioned above should be kept in

mind. It should also be kept in mind, though, that a competitive incentive system is primarily applicable to markets where recruiting opportunities vary as opposed to those where they are constant. The effects of competitive and fixed incentive programs must be carefully balanced.

### I. CURRENT INCENTIVES

As mentioned previously, the Freeman Plan was canceled in 1989. CNRC now has four incentive programs for its recruiters. These are (1) Awards Recognition for Outstanding Production Recruiters [Ref. 4], (2) Recruiter Meritorious Advancement Program (RMAP) [Ref. 5], (3) Recruiter Advancement Through Excellence (RATE) Program [Ref. 6], and (4) Gold/Silver Wreath Award For Excellence in Recruiting and Recruiting Support [Ref. 7].

All four incentive programs are awarded to those individuals who demonstrate outstanding performance in their recruiting tasks. Measuring performance, though, is normally subjective. It is done by the commanding officer when completing an individual's professional evaluation. Some of the criteria used when assessing a recruiter's performance are:

Sustained superior performance in recruiting/recruiting support, individual performance of duty in assigned billets must be exemplary..., professionalism in the daily conduct of assigned tasks..., positive leadership and sound management contributing to mission accomplishment, dedication to the recruiting mission, loyalty and support of the chain of command, and a positive Navy image fostered through the individual's behavior, cooperation, and appearance. [Ref. 7, enclosure I, p. 1]

**1. Awards Recognition for Outstanding Production Recruiters**

The first incentive scheme, Awards Recognition for Outstanding Training Production Recruiting, is an awards program which provides the guidelines to award Navy Achievement Medals (NAMs) to outstanding recruiters (as measured by the performance criteria listed above). It is also designed to replace the Recruiter Productivity and Personnel Management System (Freeman Plan). The objective of this program is to encourage Navy Recruiting District commanding officers to identify those production recruiters (including Recruiters in Charge) who deserve recognition for outstanding performance and effort. [Ref. 4:p. 1]

**2. Recruiter Meritorious Advancement Program (RMAP)**

The second incentive program is the RMAP. Its purpose is to provide substantive recognition for superior performance of production recruiters by advancing them in rank. The program authorizes CNRC to advance 57 production recruiters to the paygrade of E-6 and 14 to E-7 during a calendar year. This program is intended to function in conjunction with, but not replace, the Navy's established advancement system. [Ref. 5: p. 1]

Below is a list of the number of people in various rates (and quantities) who were promoted under the RMAP

program during CY-89, 90 and 91 [Ref. 8] (see Appendix A for definition of U.S. Navy Rates):

<u>Promotion from</u>	<u>CY-89</u>	<u>CY-90</u>	<u>CY-91</u>
E-5 to E-6	ABE (2)	ABF (2)	ABH (3)
	ABH (1)	AD (3)	AD (3)
	AE (1)	AE (2)	AO (1)
	AMS (2)	AK (1)	BM (6)
	AO (2)	AMH (1)	BT (2)
	AT (3)	AO (2)	BU (1)
	BM (2)	AQ (1)	CTO (1)
	BT (2)	AT (1)	DP (1)
	CTO (1)	AW (1)	ET (2)
	CE (1)	BM (4)	FC (2)
	DS (1)	BT (3)	GMG (1)
	EM (1)	BU (2)	HT (1)
	EN (1)	CM (1)	IC (2)
	EO (1)	CE (1)	LI (1)
	ET (1)	DT (1)	MM (6)
	GMM (2)	DM (1)	MT (1)
	HM (1)	EA (1)	OS (9)
	HT (1)	EM (1)	QM (1)
	IC (3)	EN (1)	RM (2)
	IM (1)	EW (1)	SH (1)
	LI (1)	FC (3)	SM (2)
	MM (6)	IC (2)	STG (1)

	MR	(1)	ML	(1)	TM	(1)
	MT	(2)	MM	(1)		
	RM	(1)	MR	(1)		
	SH	(2)	MS	(3)		
	TM	(1)	OS	(5)		
	YN	(1)	OTA	(1)		
			RM	(1)		
			SH	(1)		
			SM	(2)		
			STG	(3)		
			<u>UT</u>	(1)		
Subtotal		(45)		(55)		(51)
E-6 to E-7	BT	(1)	EN	(1)	AE	(1)
	GM	(1)	FC	(1)	AMS	(1)
	MM	(3)	HM	(2)	CTA	(1)
	PC	(1)	HT	(1)	CTO	(1)
	SH	(1)	MM	(1)	HM	(1)
	SM	(1)	PC	(1)	HT	(1)
			SM	(1)	LI	(1)
			SW	(1)	MM	(3)
			YN	(1)	OS	(1)
					<u>SM</u>	(1)
Subtotal		(8)		(10)		(12)
Total		(53)		(65)		(63)

### **3. Recruiter Advancement Through Excellence (RATE) Program**

On 18 October 1989 (FY 90), the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, and Training) approved the RATE program. This program is also intended to function in conjunction with the Navy's established advancement system and is open to all E-4 through E-7 personnel. This plan provides special recognition for superior performance of production recruiting teams. This program sets limits on those personnel who may be advanced to paygrades E-5 and E-6 and authorizes up to 90 advancements to paygrade E-7 and as many as 12 advancements to paygrade E-8 per fiscal year. [Ref. 6: p. 1]

Below is a list of the number of people in various rates (and quantities) who were promoted under the RATE program during FY-90 and 91 [Ref. 9] (see Appendix A for definition of U.S. Navy Rates):

	<b>FY-90</b>	<b>FY-91</b>
<u>Promotion from</u>	<u>Rate</u>	<u>Rate</u>
E-7 to E-8	CTA (1)	EM (1)
	NC (1)	DC (1)
	EM (1)	MM (1)
	<u>SK (1)</u>	<u>      </u>
Subtotal	(4)	(3)
E-6 to E-7	AMS (1)	DK (1)
	AW (1)	EN (1)
	EW (1)	MM (2)

	HM (1)	MS (1)
	HT (1)	PN (4)
	PN (2)	YN (2)
	<u>YN (1)</u>	<u>      </u>
Subtotal	(8)	(11)
E-5 to E-6		
	ABE (1)	ABE (3)
	ABF (2)	ABH (3)
	ABH (3)	AC (1)
	AD (1)	AD (6)
	AMS (3)	AE (2)
	AO (1)	AME (2)
	AT (1)	AMH (2)
	AZ (2)	AMS (3)
	BM (4)	AO (7)
	BT (2)	AS (1)
	BU (2)	AT (1)
	CTR (2)	AW (3)
	DP (1)	BM (2)
	DTA (1)	BT (3)
	EN (1)	BU (3)
	ET (1)	CTM (1)
	FC (5)	CTR (3)
	GMG (1)	CTT (3)
	GMM (1)	CE (2)
	IC (4)	DC (1)
	JO (1)	DS (1)

LI	(1)	EA	(1)
MM	(4)	EN	(4)
MS	(6)	EM	(4)
MT	(1)	ET	(1)
OM	(1)	EW	(1)
OS	(5)	FC	(7)
PN	(7)	FTB	(1)
RM	(1)	FTG	(2)
SK	(5)	FTS	(1)
SM	(3)	GMG	(3)
STG	(2)	IC	(1)
UT	(2)	IM	(1)
YN	(5)	MM	(11)
		MN	(2)
		MS	(4)
		MT	(3)
		OS	(19)
		PC	(1)
		PN	(14)
		PR	(1)
		QM	(4)
		RM	(5)
		SH	(2)
		SK	(3)

		SM (7)
		UT (1)
		<u>YN (9)</u>
Subtotal	(83)	(163)
E-4 to E-5	AT (1)	
	PN (1)	
	<u>YN (2)</u>	
Subtotal	(4)	(0)
Total	(99)	(177)

#### 4. Gold/Silver Wreath Award

The final program, Gold/Silver Wreath Award for Excellence in Recruiting and Recruiting Support, focuses primarily on the members of a recruiting station. All recruiters, officer and enlisted, assigned to recruiting billets in the direct recruiting production chain are eligible for the Gold Wreath Award. All other military and civilian personnel who are assigned to CNRC but fall outside the eligibility for the Gold Wreath are eligible for the Silver Wreath.

The Gold/Silver Wreath Award is a metal wreath device worn with a recruiting badge. The wreath encircles the recruiting badge and has a small scroll in the design for adding silver and gold stars in lieu of subsequent awards. Silver or gold stars denote second and subsequent awards. In a sequence of 49 awards, the Excellence Scroll, a device

inscribed with the word "EXCELLENCE", signifies the tenth award and is attached to the top of the Gold or Silver Wreath [Ref. 7:p. 1]

The Gold/Silver Wreath Award is awarded to member(s) of a recruiting station based on such factors as the discretion of the Commanding Officer, the overall performance of a recruiter, the quality and quantity of recruits, and, of course, whether the station meets its goal. For example, if a station has five recruiters, a monthly goal of five recruits, and meets the required criteria as delineated in CNRC Instruction 1650.4J, then each recruiter would be eligible for the next applicable reward in the sequence of 49 awards. Even if one of the five recruiters did not recruit one of the five recruits but had contributed in some way to the station's success and effort, then that recruiter is still eligible for an award. However, the Commanding Officer decides if a particular recruiter is eligible for an award.

#### J. CONCLUSION

Recruiting is expensive. The Navy has spent on the order of \$100 million recently for recruiting costs. In times of fiscal austerity, the money spent on recruiting must be used effectively and efficiently to find and attract the best qualified recruits.

But this problem is not specific to the U.S. Navy. Many companies operating under tight budgets in the private sector

of the U.S. economy are faced with similar challenges of recruiting. Therefore, it may be beneficial to study what some private companies have done in the past to handle their recruiting challenges.

## **II. LITERATURE REVIEW - THE PRIVATE SECTOR**

Recruiting and its associated problems are not unique to the U.S. Navy. The large private sector in the U.S. faces, and solves, similar recruiting problems regularly. Managers of private companies that assign salespersons to regions understand that some regions generate more sales than others for a given skill and effort, and that the amount sold varies with the salesperson's skill and effort. Somehow, they must design incentives that work. Similarly, managers of some large companies assign regions to recruiters. For a given skill and effort of a recruiter, some regions yield more recruits for a company than do others. And, for a given region, the number of recruits varies with the recruiter's skill and effort. These private sector managers must also design incentives that work.

Because so many companies face, and apparently solve, recruiting problems similar to the Navy's, the Navy may benefit by studying the incentive systems used by the private sector.

However, the literature is in its infancy -- researchers simply have not discussed this particular problem. Information concerning incentives for recruiters is scarce. Therefore, instead of looking at the recruiter in a strict, traditional definition, i.e., one whose sole purpose is to

recruit, a broadened definition may be required to shed new light on some innovative incentive mechanisms for recruiters that have been used in past.

#### A. THE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY

In the newspaper industry, the home carrier can easily be thought of as the backbone of the industry who is the recruiter for the newspaper publisher. After all, it is the carrier who primarily recruits new customers.

Paper carriers are valuable.

New carriers are more in demand now than ever before. Newspapers across the country allocate large budgets to lure prospective carriers, train them and keep them in their jobs. [Ref. 9:p. 67]

"Some big papers spend \$100,000 a year on circulation promotions, with prizes for the kids: anything from football tickets to trips to Disneyland." [Ref. 10:p. 68] Any publisher who wants a successful circulation department must find ways to keep his carriers happy and on the job. Without carriers, any publisher would not be able to maintain its particular level of circulation. Publishers would have to spend large amounts on alternative ways of delivery to maintain circulation or else limit circulation to street boxes and vendors, thereby reducing profits significantly. Again, the carrier is valuable and probably the most efficient means of newspaper delivery.

Although it sounds preposterous, the fact is that there is no other system more efficient than adolescents on foot or

on bicycles, all covering their own neighborhoods simultaneously, supported by well-organized networks of drivers, dispatchers, and supervisors. I would match the system any day against the post office, to say the least, says Donald Dunk, one of the circulation managers of *The Toronto Star*, which maintains the nation's largest circulation (500,000 daily, 800,000 Saturday) and also, not coincidentally, the best support system and the largest complement of carriers - about 12,000. [Ref. 10: p. 67]

"Delivery boys are simply the ideal system for getting the paper out," says Gerald Ouellette of the *Los Angeles Times*.

The paper carrier, therefore, is the publisher's most valuable recruiter. "The dilemma everywhere comes not only in finding carriers but [also] in keeping them happy with all manner of giveaways and contests and then recruiting replacements when such gingerbread fails to do its job or as carriers simply grow up or become bored." [Ref. 10:p. 68] Thus, incentives for the carrier, or the "customer recruiter" are important.

Incentives come in all varieties. "The staple promotion is the offer of cash or merchandise to the carriers who bring in the greatest numbers of circulation 'starts'." [Ref. 10:p. 68]

Walter Rosolowich, city circulation manager for *The Winnipeg Tribune*, defines two types of incentives, "the long-range and the quickie." The former deals with contests over an extended period of time, a few to several months for example, and results with a substantial reward, such as a trip to Disneyland. The latter focuses more on providing an

incentive to the carrier to get a certain number of new customers in a short period of time which might result in a reward of small gifts, such as tickets to a professional sports event. [Ref. 10:p. 68]

Although some publishers, such as the *Vancouver Sun*, *The Edmonton Journal*, *The Winnipeg Tribune*, and the *Montreal Gazette*, are more fond of cash incentives, *The Calgary Albertan* finds "the best results come with gifts (often televisions, radios, bikes) and trips (to Hawaii)." But Arthur J. Condliffe of the circulation department for *The Globe and Mail*, which claims to be Canada's national newspaper, warns "if you do the same thing too many times the kids tire of it, the key to this thing is variety."

Incentives are important. As in all business, even the military and, in particular, the U.S. Navy, human capital is probably the most important investment. In order to attract and retain quality personnel, businesses must not only provide incentives for their recruits, but also must provide incentives for their recruiters.

#### **B. THE COSMETICS INDUSTRY - MARY KAY**

In the cosmetics industry, the same situation applies. "Mary Kay Cosmetics...really took off in the past two years, in response to added incentives for its beauty consultants and the sales directors who supervise them." [Ref. 11:p. 50]

At Mary Kay, the beauty consultants are the sales people who not only sell cosmetics, but also recruit new beauty consultants. Thus, in effect, the beauty consultants are recruiters. Furthermore, "once a consultant recruits 24 women, she is eligible to go through a training program to become a sales director. Like the consultant, the sales director...spends more time recruiting and managing recruits than selling." [Ref. 11:p. 81] Thus, there are two levels of recruiters at Mary Kay: the consultant and the sales director.

The primary incentive that Mary Kay has used for its sales people, or beauty consultants, was an opportunity to make more money. This was done in the following manner. Initial earnings for the sales people consisted of "the markup they make on the products they sell plus a percentage of the revenue produced by the people they recruit." [Ref. 11:p. 50] Then Mary Kay increased the incentives. "Recruitment commissions were increased from a maximum of 4% of sales to a maximum of 8%, depending on the number of recruits." [Ref. 11:p. 50]

Mary Kay also increased the incentives for its sales directors. "This was accomplished by doubling recruitment commissions, adding bonuses for recruiting and selling above certain levels, and instituting awards, such as the use of expensive cars." [Ref. 11:p. 50]

In a form of other incentives, high achievers receive awards ranging from diamond rings to shopping sprees at

Neiman-Marcus. The most distinctive prize is the use of a pink Cadillac or Buick Regal. [Ref. 11:p. 50]

### C. THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY

In a traditional sense, a recruiter is one who recruits new people to work for a particular company. But in the computer industry, some companies are augmenting conventional recruiting with employee referral plans. Although employee referral plans are not a new idea, they do offer an alternative approach to recruiting that can offer significant cost savings to conventional methods of recruiting by reducing or eliminating the use of employment agencies.

In the early 1980s, as the use of computers began to explode and banking became increasingly electronic, Bank of America was in demand for Data Processors (DP). At the time, Bank of America had 9,000 DPs and would need another 1,000 professionals within the next year, according to Charles B. Smith, manager of recruitment services for electronic banking. [Ref. 12:p. 11] To meet this demand, Smith and Bank of America put together a stepwise employee referral program. "Under this system, an employee receives \$750 for the first person referred and hired, \$1,000 for the second, \$1,250 for the third, and \$1,500 for the fourth." In essence, Smith turned his 9000 Dps into 9,000 recruiters. Smith also estimated a 75% in savings of recruitment costs compared to using an employment agency. [Ref. 12:p. 11]

Crocker National Bank of San Francisco found itself in the same position. When about 70 new DP professionals were required to help the bank meet its DP needs, an employee referral program was offered that featured a \$1,000 award for each employee hired. [Ref. 12:p. 11]

This employee referral program was not limited to the banking industry nor were incentives limited to cash. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, just north of San Francisco, offered their employees referring DP professionals a choice of awards: an after-tax bonus of \$500 or a trip to one of four Club Mediterranean resorts. Fireman's professional recruiting consultant, Leonard "Bernie" Bernstein, estimated 30% to 35% of their 850 DP staff was gained through their employee referral program. [Ref. 12:p. 11]

Other companies on the East coast offer similar programs. ASA, Inc., a professional services firm, offers trips to Bermuda to its employees who refer new employees. The company estimates it saves \$1,000 to \$1,500 on recruiting costs that would have otherwise been paid to employment agencies. [Ref. 12:p. 11]

Software Design Associates, Inc. (SDA), a software development firm headquartered in New York City, has devised its own referral incentive program. Their intent was to encourage employees to continue referring Dps.

An initial referral would earn an SDA employee two tickets to a show on Broadway or dinner. If the referral was hired,

then after 30 working days, the employee would receive a \$1,000 bonus. Nine new hires would net an employee making such referrals, a "free" lunch and a chance to win a \$2,500 personal computer. In the first two years of the program, Boomi Waxman, Personnel Manager for SDA corporate headquarters, reported that 18 of 68 new hires (25%) had been made through the employee referral program. [Ref. 12:p. 11]

On a larger scale, some companies were offering relocation benefits to their new hires. Generous relocation benefits such as reduced rate mortgages were common. While Bank of America offered employee mortgages at rates of a relatively low 10.5 percent, Crocker offered mortgages at 1 percentage point below prevailing rates to those who agreed to move. [Ref. 12:p. 11]

#### D. CONTINGENCY RECRUITERS

In a more traditional sense, Contingency Recruiters are another alternative to headhunter and employment agencies. The contingency recruiter can be thought of as somewhere between the two extremes of the headhunter and the employment agency. Contingency recruiters operate independently of companies who use them and are usually called upon to find presidents, board chairmen, chief financial officers, and chief operating officers. Their fee structure can be anything from per-diem plus expenses to the most common, a prearranged fee, usually a percentage of the candidate's first year

salary. Some contingency recruiters have combination fees. That is, a company will agree to pay a certain percentage of the candidate's first year salary to the contingency recruiter and the company will also agree to pay per-diem plus expenses while the search is being made. [Ref. 13:p. 34]

#### E. CONCLUSION

The private sector of the U.S. economy is continually faced with the challenge of attracting and maintaining an effective work force. Attracting motivated workers is the main task of the recruiter. Without incentives, a recruiter may recruit someone who, although qualified to perform a particular job, puts forth only a minimum effort; a recruiter operating under an effective incentive plan, on the other hand, may find better workers. Although incentive plans for recruiters may be expensive in the short run, recruiting minimally qualified people may be even more expensive in the long run. Therefore, an incentive plan for recruiters may be more economically sound than none at all.

The next chapter presents results of original research on incentive plans that various firms use.

### III. ACTUAL INCENTIVES

As stated earlier in chapter II, the literature on incentives for recruiters is in its infancy -- researchers simply have not discussed this particular area. And just as information regarding incentives for recruiters is scarce, this research has also found that incentive programs for recruiters are scarce.

In order to assess the prevalence of incentive programs for recruiters, the research for this thesis included a written questionnaire (see Appendix B) that polled 105 companies throughout the U.S. on whether they had incentive programs for their recruiters. The questionnaire was sent to the president of each company which was randomly selected from a book titled Jobs '91 [Ref. 14]. This book is broken into chapters governing all professional groups and provides a list of all major companies of all major industries throughout the U.S. Four to seven companies from each industry group listed were selected as representative companies across each particular industry. Companies that were addressed were in the industry groups as listed in Table VI.

Twenty-two companies replied to the questionnaire in a written response. These companies represented conglomerates, banking and financing, soft drink beverages, computers, commercial airlines, cosmetics, oil, power tools, aerospace,

Table VI. MAJOR U.S. INDUSTRY GROUPS.

Advertising	Aerospace
Agriculture	Automotive
Aviation	Banking
Broadcasting	Chemicals
Computers and Electronics	Conglomerates
Consumer Products	Energy
Fashion	Film and Entertainment
Financial Services	Food and Beverage
Health Service and Pharmaceutical	Hospitality
Insurance	Manufacturing
Metals and Mining	Paper and Forest Products
Publishing	Real Estate/Construction
Retailing	Telecommunications
Transportation	Travel
Utilities	

technology research and development, scientific research and development, sugar, food chain stores, domestic automobile production, and foreign automobile production. But of the 22 companies that responded, 20 had no incentive program whatsoever.

Although most of the companies polled had no specific incentive program, one of two recurring responses was that some companies offered compensation in the form of a superior performance award program or bonus. That is, employees who found valuable recruits for the company were recognized for

their efforts in the form of a performance award but not in a specific incentive award. The other recurring response was that executive search firms or headhunter agencies were used and were paid their customary fees. But overall, the 20 companies that responded to the questionnaire had no specific incentive program for their recruiters.

Two of the companies, however, did mention some form of an incentive program for their recruiters. One of the companies operated its incentive program under an employee referral system. It paid a recruitment bonus in the form of a \$1,000 U.S. Savings Bond to those employees who recruited full-time personnel (as opposed to part-time).

The other company operated on a point system. This company, which will be called company "X" for anonymity, awarded points which could be accumulated and redeemed for valuable prizes. Every sales agent had the opportunity to cash in his or her points from a selection of 261 gift awards from an awards catalog. Those agents, however, who reached a higher level of sales, could choose from another awards catalog consisting of an additional 491 gift offerings. Such gifts were stereo systems, outdoor recreational equipment, computer systems, video camera equipment, luggage, china, and childrens' toys. This point system operated in three different aspects: total sales, sales increase, and recruiting.

Under the total sales aspect, employees earned a certain number of points as their total sales, measured over a one

year period, increased. Points were earned for each \$500 increment in sales and were awarded by category as described in Table VII.

**Table VII. POINT DISTRIBUTION FOR EVERY \$500 IN SALES FOR COMPANY X.**

Points awarded	Category
1	Up to \$8,500
3	\$8,501 to \$20,000
5	\$20,001 to \$40,000
7	\$40,000 to \$60,000
10	\$60,001 and up

The second aspect of the incentive program depended on the amount that sales increased over the previous year. That is, for each \$500 increase over the previous year, points were awarded as shown in Table VIII.

The third aspect of the point system involved recruiting. For each successful recommendation, an employee would earn a certain number of points. The points were awarded as shown in Table IX. The employee also had the option of choosing a \$20 check for each successful recommendation.

One of the companies polled -- a defense contractor -- offered a reason for not having an incentive plan -- the company does not need one in the present economic conditions.

Table VIII. POINTS EARNED FOR EACH \$500 INCREASE OVER PREVIOUS YEAR FOR COMPANY X.

Total sales for present year	Points earned for each \$500 increase over previous year
\$1 to \$8,500	5
\$8,501 to \$20,000	15
\$20,000 to \$40,000	25
\$40,001 to \$60,000	35
\$60,001 to \$80,000	45
\$80,000 and over	50

Table IX. NUMBER OF POINTS EARNED FOR RECRUITING FOR COMPANY X.

Number of successful recommendations	Points earned
1	20 + 10 Bonus
2 through 5	20 each
6 through 10	25 each
11 and over	30 each

This particular company stated:

Unlike the U.S. military, we invariably find ourselves with a surplus of potential employees. As such, we can be far more selective of those to whom we offer employment and do not necessarily need to spend much time recruiting qualified people.

This response may be an underlying reason why most companies do not have an incentive program. Most companies have potential employees "knocking on their door" whereas the Navy must usually "knock on" a potential recruit's door.

Nevertheless, just as information on incentives for recruiters is scarce, so is information on incentive programs.

Although the research for this thesis has discovered that incentive programs for recruiters are not nearly as popular as initially thought, the research has nevertheless discovered a unique incentive program in the real estate world.

One may be initially inclined to think that there are no recruiters in the real estate industry. If one thinks of realtors as recruiters of buyers and sellers of real estate, however, then in essence, realtors are recruiters. And one company in the real estate world is using the paradigm of sales commission in a new way.

Real Estate Maximum, more commonly known as RE/MAX (pronounced REEMAX), uses an alternative approach to incentivize their realtors. Instead of splitting a traditional six percent sales commission with possibly another realtor and their own realtors, RE/MAX allows their realtors to keep 100% of the sales commission but only after meeting a fee for use of the franchise. The fee ranges on average from \$18,000 to \$25,000 per year [Ref. 15, p. A1] which is paid by the realtor on a monthly basis. This equates to \$1,500 to about \$2,100 per month. So as long as the realtor can meet the monthly fee plus any office and related expenses, then any sales commission after the monthly fee and expenses belongs solely to the realtor.

Thus, in essence, there are two incentives here. The first incentive is to work hard enough to meet the monthly fees and related expenses. This is in contrast to the traditional method of other real estate firms where the company usually pays for office and related expenses but also takes up to 50% of the sales commission depending on sales volume. For example, two real estate companies usually split a six percent sales commission upon the sale of a house. This, of course, means that each company gets three percent. Then each company in turn splits the three percent with their agent. That is, each agent winds up with 1.5 percent sales commission. But as the agent's sales volume goes up, the agent will usually get to keep a little more than 1.5 percent of the sales commission. But in the traditional sense, the agent never gets to keep all of the sales commission, whereas, working under the RE/MAX system, although there is pressure to meet a minimum amount, once the minimum amount has been met, then all future sales commissions belong solely to the realtor. This system may be especially enticing to a successful real estate agent.

The second incentive is sole possession of the sales commission. Once the minimum monthly expenses have been met, then 100% of a sales commission can mean a large sum of money. So those agents who feel they can easily meet a cost of \$1,500 to \$2,100 per month plus related expenses may want to use the RE/MAX incentive program.

#### **IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The purpose of this thesis was to study the different types of incentive programs for recruiters that are used in the private sector of the U.S. economy and to examine how, if possible, incentives that are used for civilian recruiters can be applied to U.S. Navy recruiters.

But quite the opposite has been discovered. Probably the single most surprising discovery of this research is the scarcity of incentive programs for recruiters in the private sector of the U.S. economy. In addition to this discovery, four themes have evolved from this research: 1) the manner in which the term "recruiter" is defined, 2) potential recruiters, 3), referral systems for recruiters and 4) the Navy is a potential role model, if not a leader, of incentive programs for recruiters. These four themes are explained below.

##### **A. LESSONS FOR THE NAVY**

Although the Navy can be considered a role model of incentive programs for recruiters, the Navy may be able to further strengthen its recruiting force by broadening its definition of the term "recruiter." The literature review in chapter II showed how a broadened definition of recruiter led to some innovative ideas of who recruiters could be. Paper

carriers could be looked at as recruiters of customers; beauty consultants at Mary Kay also acted as recruiters; the computer industry used employee referral programs to encourage their DPs to act as recruiters. Chapter III looked at real estate agents as recruiters of buyers and sellers of real estate.

So by expanding the definition of recruiter, the second theme may be considered. Any employee or member of an organization may become a potential recruiter. And in the case of the Navy, instead of looking at its recruiters as only those who are specifically assigned to the recruiting force, the Navy could look at each one of its members as a potential recruiter.

This introduces the third theme mentioned above. When the computer industry used their DPs as recruiters, they also used employee referral plans to incentivize their new recruiters. Maybe, then, the Navy could set up a referral incentive or system to those members whose referral winds up with a successful recruit. This, in turn, leads to a potential topic for further research -- a referral system for the Navy.

The final theme that can be drawn from this research is that the Navy is a potential role model, if not a leader, of incentive programs for recruiters (and not vice versa as initially thought). Part of the purpose of this thesis was to examine how, if possible, the incentive systems used for recruiters in the private sector could be applied to the U.S.

Navy. But because of the scarcity of incentive systems in the private sector, it may be the private sector companies, that have a need for incentive programs for their recruiters, that may benefit from studying those incentive systems of the Navy or the other branches of the armed services. Ironically, further research that may be beneficial, then, is how to adapt and apply Navy incentives to the private sector.

Two more significant points can be drawn from this research. The first was made earlier in the literature review. In the newspaper industry, Arthur J. Condliffe of the circulation department for *The Globe and Mail* warned about using an incentive too much for paper carriers. "If you do the same thing too many times the kids tire of it, the key to this thing is variety." Although the Navy's recruiting force is constantly turning over, i.e., a recruiter's term last two to three years before he or she moves on to a new assignment, and may not get tired of the incentives, it is an important point to consider. Further research in the area of varying incentive programs for the Navy may be another possible research topic.

The other point brought out in this research was that of Company X's incentive plans for sales and recruits. Further inspection of Tables VII, VIII, and IX reveals that for each marginal sale or recruit, the points awarded always increased. This seems to reflect that the next sale or recruit is more difficult than the last. So the company was varying awards to

compensate for the additional difficulty. For example, looking at Table VIII, after the fifth recruit, 25 points are awarded instead of 20, (the number of points awarded for the first five recruits). This suggests, as seems plausible, that the supply of recruits is upward-sloping; that is, recruits are harder and harder to get, so that recruiters must get increasing compensation for each additional recruit.

#### B. A LESSON FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR

As has already been discussed, the Navy or military is a role model, if not a leader, of incentive programs. Incentive plans for recruiters in the private sector are limited at best. Those companies that require an incentive plan for their recruiters may benefit most by examining the incentive mechanisms already in place in the Navy or armed services. Researchers, though, would have to find ways in which to adapt and apply incentives for Navy recruiters to recruiters in the private sector.

## APPENDIX A. DEFINITION OF U.S. NAVY RATES

### GROUP I: DECK

BM	. . . . .	Boatswain's Mate
EW	. . . . .	Electronics Warfare Technician
OS	. . . . .	Operations Specialist
OT	. . . . .	Ocean Systems Technician
OS	. . . . .	Operations Specialist
QM	. . . . .	Quartermaster
ST	. . . . .	Sonar Technician
SM	. . . . .	Signalman

### GROUP II: ORDNANCE

FT	. . . . .	Fire Control Technician
GM	. . . . .	Gunner's Mate
MN	. . . . .	Mineman
MT	. . . . .	Missile Technician
TM	. . . . .	Torpedoman's Mate

### GROUP III: ELECTRONICS

DS	. . . . .	Data Systems Technician
ET	. . . . .	Electronics Technician

### GROUP IV: PRECISION EQUIPMENT

IM	. . . . .	Instrumentman
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### GROUP V: ADMINISTRATIVE AND CLERICAL

CT	. . . . .	Cryptologic Technician
DP	. . . . .	Data Processing Technician (DP)

DK . . . . . Disbursing Clerk  
JO . . . . . Journalist  
MS . . . . . Mess Management Specialist  
NC . . . . . Navy Counselor  
PN . . . . . Personnelman  
PC . . . . . Postal Clerk  
RM . . . . . Radioman  
SH . . . . . Ship's Serviceman  
SK . . . . . Storekeeper  
YN . . . . . Yeoman

GROUP VI: MISCELLANEOUS

DM . . . . . Illustrator-Draftsman  
LI . . . . . Lithographer

GROUP VII: ENGINEERING AND HULL

BT . . . . . Boiler Technician  
EM . . . . . Electrician's Mate  
EN . . . . . Engineman  
HT . . . . . Hull Maintenance Technician  
IC . . . . . Interior Communications Electrician  
MM . . . . . Machinist's Mate  
MR . . . . . Machinery Repairman

GROUP VIII: CONSTRUCTION

BU . . . . . Builder  
CE . . . . . Construction Electrician  
EA . . . . . Engineering Aide  
UT . . . . . Utilitiesman

GROUP IX: AVIATION

AB . . . . . Aviation Boatswain's Mate  
AD . . . . . Aviation Machinist's Mate  
AE . . . . . Aviation Electrician's Mate  
AK . . . . . Aviation Storekeeper  
AM . . . . . Aviation Structural Mechanic  
AO . . . . . Aviation Ordnanceman  
AQ . . . . . Aviation Fire Control Technician  
AS . . . . . Aviation Support Equipment Technician  
AT . . . . . Aviation Electronics Technician  
AW . . . . . Aviation Antisubmarine Warfare Operator  
AZ . . . . . Aviation Maintenance Administration  
PR . . . . . Aircrew Survival Equipmentman

GROUP X: MEDICAL

HM . . . . . Hospital Corpsman

Source: The Bluejacket's Manual [Ref. 16]

**APPENDIX B. QUESTIONNAIRE**

Mark L. Skidmore  
LT USN  
SMC 2840  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California  
93940

To the President,

My name is LT Mark L. Skidmore and I am a thesis student at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I am conducting thesis research in the area of incentives for recruiters.

If you have any type of written documentation of your incentive programs for your recruiters, will you please send it to me.

Unless you instruct otherwise, I will keep your responses confidential.

Thank you for your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Mark L. Skidmore  
LT USN

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